

Government, Civil Society, and Posterity

**Discussion Paper No. 07-12
December 17, 2007**

Makoto Usami*

* Department of Social Engineering, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology,
Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1-W9-90 O-okayama, Meguro, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan.
Phone & fax: +81-3-5734-2933. Email: usami@soc.titech.ac.jp

Abstract¹

Since civil powers emerged in Eastern Europe, the idea of civil society as distinguished from government and market institutions has gained interest among political philosophers. Normative theories of the relationship between government and civil society can be classified by two criteria: adversarial/allied and superseding/complementing. Governments, like large businesses, have been frequently condemned for their predictably adverse impacts on future generations in the context of environmental problems. Therefore, the adversarial/superseding view appears plausible, claiming that associations and movements in civil society should protest against the establishment, and that the current roles of the government should be largely replaced by those of civil organizations. The present paper argues that this view is incorrect. After examining the growing expectation that either sustainable development or sustainability provides the foundations of concern for posterity, I offer an alternative argument: because we received natural and human-made legacies from our ancestors, enabling us to lead a safe and healthy life, we are obliged by a duty of intergenerational fair play to bequeath the legacies to our descendants. If it is established that the present generation in each society has an obligation of intertemporal concern, the government acting in the name of its citizens bears the primary responsibility to specify and implement the obligation. Then I explore what kinds of difficulties a government may encounter in carrying out its responsibility, and how agencies in civil society can help to diminish the difficulties, with special reference to government failures. The paper concludes by suggesting that the allied/complementing view might be a more promising approach to the question of intergenerational justice.

Keywords: fairness, government failures, intergenerational justice, sustainability

¹ An earlier version of the present paper was presented at the First International Symposium on Democracy for the Sustainable Future, Kyoto University, Kyoto, May 18–20, 2007. I would like to thank my commentators at the symposium, Frank Fisher, Koichi Hasegawa, and Jun Iio, for their helpful questions and suggestions. My thanks are also due to the organizer of the symposium, Yukio Adachi, for his hospitality. Some of the materials employed in this paper are from Usami, 2006a, 2006b.

Introduction

In the past twenty years, the idea of civil society as distinguished from government and market institutions has gained interest among political philosophers and social theorists. Recent academic interest in civil society has its practical roots in the political events that occurred in Eastern Europe from the 1970s to the 1980s. During that time, communist regimes faced growing criticism from academics and activists seeking democracy and freedom. Most notably, in Poland several intellectuals criticized their highly bureaucratic and centralized government for repressing citizens' voices and initiatives, and described the mounting crisis of the communist regime as the "revolt of civil society against the state." Since the wave of democratization swept the region by replacing oppressive governments with more democratic ones based on civil society in 1989, the concept of civil society as opposed to the government and the market has been praised by an increasing number of philosophers and practitioners on both sides of the Atlantic. In Japan, where civil society had long been a key concept in the literature on Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and other Western philosophers, the distinction between civil society and the market has been introduced and discussed in recent years.

The concept of civil society dates back to ancient times, but influential conceptions of the same idea have varied enormously over time. The term "*politikē koinōnīa*," coined by Aristotle, and its Latin translation "*societas civilis*," referred both to a community of citizens—free men as opposed to slaves—and to a political organization governing the community. In other words, there was no clear distinction between society and the state from ancient times until the Middle Ages. This classical conception of civil society was not challenged until the eighteenth century, when a distinction between civil society and the state was suggested on the European continent and civil society came to be considered in connection with individual property in Britain. In the nineteenth century, George Hegel conceptualized civil society mainly as a system of needs, meaning a market system involving social labor and commodity exchange, while also holding that civil society includes the judiciary for protecting citizens' property, administrative agencies providing public services, and occupational corporations relieving the poor. The state is, on his account, the supreme form of morals that realizes perfect liberty and provides the final prescription for poverty caused by economic activities in civil society. Marx accepted Hegel's basic idea that

civil society is an economic sphere distinguished from the state, but departed from him by reinterpreting civil society as a bourgeois society; that is, a realm of economic activities by capitalists exploiting proletarians.²

The central feature of currently influential conceptions of civil society is that this realm is clearly distinguished not only from the government/state but from the market. The nongovernmental and noneconomic character of civil society is stressed by numerous authors, including Jürgen Habermas (1990[1962]: 46) and Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato (1992: 410, 422–433, 464), among others.³ Today civil society is often considered as a distinct sphere where nongovernmental and nonprofit associations emerge, develop, and flourish. Among these associations are churches, political parties, professional and occupational organizations, labor unions, social movements, charity groups, the media, schools and universities, academic societies, cultural circles, and sports clubs.⁴

² A perceptive review of historical thoughts on civil society, with an emphasis on developments in the German-speaking world, is provided in Riedel, 1975.

³ Some political philosophers, notably Michael Walzer (1992[1991]), address the broader conception of civil society that encompasses the market. This conception is also widely shared in the literature on social trust.

⁴ Another important issue in discussing civil society concerns how this sphere should be distinguished from others. Most scholars seem to suppose that civil society is contrastively distinct from governmental politics and from market economy and that the wider the scope of the first becomes, the narrower those of the rest are. This understanding can be called the territory model of civil society. A close look at realities in civil society, however, reveals that its realm overlaps with the sphere of governmental politics and that of market economy, and hence the territory model might be incorrect. Nonprofit organizations provide private goods, gain profit, and employ officers and workers, just as private corporations do. These organizations are even in market competition with businesses in the areas of welfare work and community service. On the other hand, nongovernmental organizations get involved in the political process when they engage in policy advocacy. A political party, which generally counts among agencies in civil society, constitutes a governing body when it becomes the ruling party or joins the ruling coalition. A more pertinent description of civil

Normative theories of the relationship of civil society to a government can be classified by two criteria: adversarial/allied and superseding/complementing. Thus, they logically fall into four categories. The position I call the adversarial/superseding view claims that associations and movements in civil society should protest against the establishment, and that the current roles of government should be largely performed by civil organizations instead. The assumption here is that a government is essentially an apparatus of coercion and domination, and therefore the scope of governmental policy should be strictly limited by citizens. This view seems to be extensively shared in several camps, including advocates of the traditional Marxist-Gramscian conception of civil society, proponents of civic discourse and voluntarism, and antistate radical democrats.

By contrast, the allied/complementing view states that civil society should help the government through constructive criticism and general support. This view recognizes the significance of a governing body and advances the collaboration of volunteer associations with a government. In empirical studies on the voluntary sector, observers report that collaboration between governments and civil agencies has emerged and developed in many industrialized countries (e.g., Gidron, Kramer, and Salamon, 1992).⁵ In normative discussions on this sector, however, it seems that the allied/complementing view is only recently finding advocates.

A standpoint between these two opposing positions, the adversarial/complementing view, holds that political objections by civil associations effectively prevent the government from becoming corrupt and abusive. If this perspective also conceives that the government can, through laws and regulations, prevent these associations from being unaccountable and self-indulgent, then checks and balances are implied: civil society should have a number of checks by which it can keep the government in balance and vice versa. The adversarial/allied dimension is a matter of degree and thus

society than the territory model might be what I call the cluster model. As with a star cluster, the borders of civil society are blurred, and the same agency can belong to this sphere and governmental politics or market economy. Civil society is distinguished from other realms not by types of agency but by its actions as viewed by the observer.

⁵ For the development of corporative relationships between governments and environmental movements in Japan, see Hasegawa, 2003.

comprises a variety of standpoints between the adversarial/complementing view and the allied/complementing view. The last category, the allied/superseding view, is logically possible, but may not find any actual supporters, and hence will not be considered.

One area in which the adversarial/superseding view appears plausible is that of moral issues regarding intergenerational relationships in the context of environmental problems, though this is an area virtually ignored by a vast majority of normative theorists on civil society. It is widely believed that the welfare and even the survival of future generations may be threatened by global warming, the pollution of air and water, and the massive consumption of scarce resources. Large businesses are the first target for condemnation by environmental activists and forward-looking citizens for the predictably adverse impact of their economic activities upon future generations. Governments also are frequently criticized for their involvement in threats to posterity's interests through the effects of environmental degradation by public works projects, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the failure of effective environmental regulation. Taking account of the widespread distrust of government and private corporations in the context of a moral relationship between generations, one might come to appreciate the recent praise of civil society. Moreover, conceiving that the government is a threat to future individuals, one might suggest that volunteer groups and social movements should protest against government policy for the sake of these individuals. The adversarial/superseding view appears convincing here.

However, a close look at the moral problems regarding intergenerational relationships will reveal that the adversarial/superseding view might be less plausible than it appears at first glance. I will argue that this view might be incorrect because it overlooks the primary responsibility of government to protect the interests of future generations. The idea of governmental responsibility presupposes that the present citizens of each country bear a moral obligation to concern themselves about posterity. Why do the citizens have such an obligation? To answer this question, one needs to refer to the literature on intergenerational justice.

For more than three decades, moral problems regarding the relationship between generations have attracted interest among legal, moral, and political philosophers. Numerous studies have been devoted to searching for the moral foundations of concern for posterity and to inquiring into the theoretical difficulties around that concern.

Daniel Callahan (1971) argues that we are bound to be concerned about our successors because we are indebted to our predecessors. Contractarians work to develop the theoretical devices originated by John Rawls (1999[1971]), such as the original position and the just savings principle (e.g., Richards, 1971: 81, 134; Wissenburg, 1999). Inspired by Joel Feinberg's seminal essay (1974), many authors, notably Robert Elliot (1989) and Ernest Partridge (1990), argue that future generations have the right to require the current generation to promote their interests. Jan Narveson (1978) takes a utilitarian approach to the issues regarding future individuals, including the population problem. John O'Neill (1993: 1–61) proposes a theory of intertemporal concern based on the Aristotelian conception of happiness, while Avner de-Shalit (1995: 1–65) evokes the notion of a transgenerational community. Alfred Beckerman and Joanna Pasek (2001: 11–124) criticize the major theories of intergenerational concern and suggest protecting posterity's interests by maintaining a decent society that respects basic human rights. This research area was often mentioned as "obligations to future generations" in the 1970s and 1980s, but "intergenerational justice" has become a more popular name in recent years.⁶

By employing and elaborating on concepts and ideas presented in the literature on intergenerational justice, I examine the extent to which the adversarial/superseding view has solidity. To begin with, I conduct a preliminary consideration of the concept of future generations. Next, the growing expectation that the idea of sustainable development, or that of sustainability, should provide the foundation for intertemporal concern is examined. I then suggest an alternative argument for the duty to care about our descendants, based on the idea of intergenerational fair play. If it is established by this argument that the present citizens of each country bear an obligation to protect the welfare of their offspring, then the government acting in their name should have the primary responsibility for specifying and implementing the obligation. Finally, I explore what type of difficulties that a government may encounter in carrying out its responsibility and how agencies in civil society can help the government to diminish them, with special reference to government failures. The present paper concludes by suggesting that the allied/complementing view might be a more promising approach to

⁶ I elsewhere provide a wide-ranging review of the literature on intergenerational justice (Usami, 2004).

the question of concern for future generations.

Categories and Characteristics of Posterity

To investigate governmental tasks rigorously in the context of intergenerational relationship, one needs to explicate the concept of future generations. Let us begin by defining the intended meanings of past, present, and future generations. By past generations, I mean individuals who are now dead; by present generation, I mean individuals who are now alive; and by future generations, I mean individuals who are not yet born. Under these definitions, the line between present and future generations is continuously shifting.

In the literature on intergenerational justice, several writers have suggested an analogy between future descendants and distant contemporaries living in foreign countries (e.g., O'Neill, 1999). This analogy is incorrect, because some of our successors may be far from us not only in time but in space. An infant born in Kyoto in 2010 is temporarily closer to me than one born there in 2100; a child living in Tokyo in 2050 is spatially nearer to me than one living in Johannesburg in that year.

The two dimensions—time and space—of future population provide a basis for a distinction among different categories. In the dimension of temporality, I will differentiate between two subgroups within future generations: overlapping and nonoverlapping. Martin Golding (1972) first suggested a somewhat similar distinction, when he argued that our concern should not cover distant descendants who will not belong to our moral community, for we cannot know much about them. Unfortunately, the line he suggested has been scarcely used by other authors. In elaborating on Golding's idea of descendants belonging to our moral community, I define an overlapping future generation as a set of the individuals of whom at least one member will come into existence before the death of the last member of the current generation. A nonoverlapping future generation refers to a group consisting of only those who will be born after the latest member of the existing generation has died. To put it another way, some members of an overlapping future generation will eventually become the contemporaries of the younger members of the present generation, unlike those of a nonoverlapping future generation.

In the dimension of spatiality, it is possible to conceive future generations at four

levels: local, national, regional, and global. Focusing on the national level here, I distinguish a fellow future generation from a foreign one. A fellow future generation is defined as a set of possible individuals mainly based in the country where the present generation in question resides. A foreign future generation means a class of potential individuals mainly living in other countries. This distinction is conceptual, and there will be some people belonging to both fellow and foreign groups at the same time from the perspective of the current generation in a particular country. It is also noteworthy that the more remote the descendants considered are, the less significant becomes the distinction between fellows and foreigners. This is in part because two or more currently sovereign states may be integrated into one in the future, or conversely one state may be divided into two or more. One can imagine even the distant future where the political system of the sovereign state could be abolished and humanity would live under some other kind of social order. As to our very distant descendants—say, those who will be alive 3000 years from now—there is no point in distinguishing fellows and foreigners. Hence, it seems reasonable that the object of our concern, if the concern is established, should be extended to include all human beings on the globe.

Stemming from the pair of distinctions made above, succeeding generations fall into four categories: overlapping/fellow, overlapping/foreign, nonoverlapping/fellow, and nonoverlapping/foreign. It seems simplest to provide good reason for public policies and private actions to advance the interests of overlapping/fellow future generations, because the promotion of their interests will also serve their elderly contemporaries, who are the younger members of the current generation. More difficult is to justify policies and actions to promote the welfare of nonoverlapping successors, fellow or foreign, in the case of conflict between their interests and ours. This is because although we now benefit them, it is impossible for them to benefit us in return. In addition, justifying intertemporal concern for foreign descendants is more laborious than doing so for fellow ones, when there is an international conflict of interest. Consequently, the biggest challenge in the study of justice between generations is to provide the moral grounds of concern for nonoverlapping/foreign future generations.

The next preliminary task for scrutinizing the moral relationship between generations is to identify the features relating to the concept of future generations. Three features seem to be particularly relevant. First, since Golding's essay (1972) was published, it has been widely recognized that we cannot know the characteristics of

future generations, including their values, tastes, lifestyles, technology, and social institutions. The nature of our descendants' unknowability, however, depends on the category to which they belong. Our ignorance about an overlapping future generation is temporary in that we will be able to obtain information on some members of the generation when they come into existence and become our contemporaries. Furthermore, it is easier to know about overlapping/fellow descendants than to know about overlapping/foreign ones *ceteris paribus*. In contrast to our overlapping succeeding generations, it remains impossible in perpetuity to acquire information on our nonoverlapping/fellow and nonoverlapping/foreign successors.⁷

Second, it is common wisdom that intergenerational relationships are unilateral in that the natural and social environments of each generation are influenced by its predecessors, but a generation cannot reward or punish its predecessors for their actions. The implication of this wisdom appears to be that all of our descendants are equally passive in their relationship with us. However, the nature of their passivity varies from category to category. A relationship between the present generation and its overlapping successors is temporarily one-sided, until some of those successors come into existence and begin to interact with the younger members of the present generation as their contemporaries. Such interaction will take place not merely with future fellows but also with future foreigners, although interaction beyond borders will generally be weaker than domestic interaction. In contrast to overlapping future generations, nonoverlapping ones will have no influence on the current generation at all. In short, a relationship between different overlapping generations changes from nonreciprocity to reciprocity when some members of the succeeding generation become contemporaries of the preceding one, whereas any relationship between nonoverlapping generations cannot be reciprocal.

Third, a remarkable feature of future generations concerns the non-identity problem raised by Derek Parfit (1984: 351–379). The non-identity problem refers to the fact that the biological identity of each person depends on the actions of the person's

⁷ It is true that there are several theoretical devices for predicting the future, including the Delphi method and scenario writing. However, knowing about future generations is one thing, and making predictions about them is another; besides, the more distant from us they are, the more difficult an exact prediction about them may be.

natural parents and the circumstances of conception. For instance, if a boy had been born to my parents ten months earlier than I was, then he could not be identical to me. My identity depends directly on my parents' actions, and indirectly on the numerous prior events that affected their identities and actions. In a similar way, the identity of each individual in the future is sensitive to the countless events that predate the individual's birth, including cumulative actions of the present generation. It follows that the identity of a particular future generation in part depends upon how members of the existing generation choose to act. This feature can be called the biological identity dependence. Future persons also have the social identity dependence on us, which means that their values, tastes, lifestyles, technology, and institutions are sensitive to our choice of actions.

What theoretical implications do these three characteristics of future generations have in justifying intertemporal concern? Golding suggests that our concern should cover only persons in the near future, who will belong to our moral community, for characteristics of nonmember future individuals are unknowable for us. True, the unknowability of future generations is an undeniable fact, but his argument is less plausible than it appears at first glance. In general, there are two types of concern: negative and positive. Negative concern for a person or a group is to refrain from an action that harms the person or the group; in contrast, positive concern is to take an action that benefits the person or the group. In both types, one can conceive the degree of concern. Refraining from murder is the minimum negative concern; giving food to a starving person is the minimum positive concern when one has plenty of food. What is relevant to the demands of intertemporal justice in the context of environmental problems may be the minimum negative concern. To reduce the adverse impact of our actions on the safety and health of future people, we do not need details of their preferences and circumstances (cf. Callahan, 1971: 272–275). A genuine implication of posterity's unknowability is rather that the utilitarian approach, if it is applied to our relationship with remote nonoverlapping descendants, suffers from a lack of necessary information. The utility functions they will have are unknown and difficult for us to predict.

Contractarianism and communitarianism are rivals in contemporary political philosophy. Nevertheless, they share the same basis—interaction among agents. Both theories thus face similar difficulties in the context of the relationship between remote

generations, in which successors are necessarily passive toward their predecessors. Reciprocity is of critical importance in the Rawlsian theory of justice, but there is no reciprocity between nonoverlapping generations. The communitarian political philosopher, de-Shalit, tries to show that some kind of interaction can occur between nonoverlapping generations, and yet his arguments are questionable.

A widely accepted argument from the rights of posterity is undermined by the biological identity dependence of future generations upon the present one. Let G^C represent a set of the individuals who will exist in 2200 if a policy of environmental conservation is adopted at present, and G^D a class of persons living at that time if a policy of environmental destruction is chosen. Suppose that the welfare level of G^D is considerably lower than that of G^C . In the case where the destruction policy is adopted, one cannot say that the present generation violates the rights of G^D . There is no intersection between the two different sets represented by G^C and G^D , as the biological identity dependence implies. If the current generation chooses the conservation policy, the people existing in 2200 would be not G^D but G^C , and hence it is impossible to infringe on the rights of G^D by adopting the destruction policy. On the other hand, the social identity dependence undercuts the utilitarian argument, because the values and tastes shaping the utility functions of our descendants are sensitive to our present choice of public policies and private actions. It is meaningless to ask whether or not the utility level of future persons would be higher in one possible situation than in the other, when what shapes the utility function will in part depend on our choice.

The three features—unknowability, passivity, and identity dependence—of future generations together imply that major theories of intertemporal justice suffer from theoretical difficulties.⁸ In the next section, I examine the newly suggested argument that the notion of sustainable development, or that of sustainability, provides the firm grounds of concern for posterity. After this examination, I address an alternative theory grounded on the idea of intergenerational fair play.

⁸ Major theories of justice between generations are examined at length in Usami, 1996, 1998, 2004, 2006a, 2006b.

Sustainable Development and Sustainability

In international environmental politics, “sustainable development,” a term made popular by the Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987), has become a political slogan claiming to integrate the demand of environmental conservation and the goal of economic development. This term is intended to mediate international conflict between developed and developing countries. It has become commonplace among policy makers and environmental activists in many parts of the world, while being harshly criticized for its ambiguity. In the area of environmental economics, sustainable development or sustainability has been employed as a key concept in theoretical and empirical studies. Finally, in recent discussion on intertemporal justice, a growing number of scholars suggest that the idea of sustainable development, or that of sustainability, provides moral foundation for protecting the interests of future generations.

In this section, I examine the extent to which the argument from sustainable development or sustainability successfully justifies concern for the future. Before examining this argument, however, a note on definition will be in order. “Sustainable development” and “sustainability” are often used interchangeably, but I will clearly distinguish between the two terms, because the former contains the notion of improving or increasing something, while the latter implies that of keeping something invariable at a certain level.

Both sustainable development and sustainability are defined in various ways. The Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987: 43) ambiguously formulates sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” Brian Barry (1999: 101) offers a clear definition of sustainability, and his definition seems to be a good starting point for analyzing both sustainability and sustainable development. He defines sustainability as the idea that there is some X whose value should be maintained into the indefinite future, as far as it lies within our power to do so. In a similar vein, I formulate sustainable development as the idea that there is some X whose value should be increased into the interminable future, as far as it lies within our power to do so.

The next question to ask is this: what should be the content of X ? The interpretations of X defined or implied in the environmental economics literature can be divided into

three types.⁹ The first is the resourcist interpretation, according to which sustainability means maintaining the amounts of natural assets available to each generation, such as unpolluted soils and nonrenewable resources, at the present level. Sustainable development refers to an increase in the amounts of natural assets distributed to each generation so that those who come into existence later may enjoy more assets. The principle that environmental economists call strong sustainability, which requires the constancy of natural capital and of the aggregate of natural and human-made capital, is compatible with the resourcist conception of sustainability. Second, the welfarist understanding maintains that sustainability means keeping a constant utility level for each future generation, and that sustainable development means increasing the utility level of each subsequent generation to allow those who exist later to have higher utility. What economists call weak sustainability, requiring only that the aggregate of natural and human-made capital should be nondeclining, is similar to the welfarist understanding of sustainability. The third version, which is developmentalist in spirit, holds that sustainability means keeping gross national product per capita, consumption per capita, or any other index to economic growth at a certain level, while sustainable development is to increase any one of them continuously.

The question arises of how one can justify concern for posterity by evoking the idea of sustainability through the adoption of one of the three conceptions described above. Sustainability requires maintaining natural assets, utility, or some index to economic growth at the current level, but the question remains of why they should be maintained. It begs the question, therefore, to attempt to justify intertemporal concern on the basis of sustainability. This is also the case with the notion of sustainable development. The two concepts can work only if a public policy benefiting those born in the future is established.

Moreover, each of the three conceptions of X has different limitations, if either sustainability or sustainable development is employed as a normative criterion of justice between generations. Sustainability interpreted from a resourcist viewpoint might lead to a counterintuitive and infeasible conclusion. Suppose that n generations, which will not overlap with one another and will have no population growth, will exist

⁹ For a survey of different definitions of sustainable development in the economic literature, see Pezzey, 1992.

sequentially after the present generation, and that the total amount of particular nonrenewable resource reserves is Q . What amount of the resource in question do the demands of sustainability allocate to the present generation? The answer is $Q/n+1$. Under the reasonable assumption that humanity will last for a very long time, the value of $Q/n+1$ should be unacceptably small. Moreover, if predicted population growth is considered, the amount of the resource available for the current generation should be much less than $Q/n+1$. Sustainable development is even more objectionable than sustainability in this respect, because the former allocates a lesser amount of the resource to the existing generation than the latter does.

The welfarist conception of sustainable development is susceptible to two interpretations. If the conception requires a continuous increase of the total utility of future generations, it encounters what Parfit (1984: 381–390) calls the repugnant conclusion in his critique of total utilitarianism. The repugnant conclusion is that for any possible large population, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence would be better *ceteris paribus*, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living. The repugnant conclusion applies to the version of the welfarist view that advances an increase of the total utility of future generations. On the other hand, if this view demands an increase of average utility, it faces what I call the revolting conclusion. By the revolting conclusion, I mean that if those who have less utility than the average are exterminated by some method that does not make the rest of the population worse off, then this extinction must be better than their existence.

Furthermore, neither sustainable development nor sustainability in a welfarist sense works as a criterion for intergenerational justice because of the features of future generations previously mentioned. First, the unknowability of future persons implies that we have no information on the utility functions they will have. This problem is most severe when applying the concept of sustainable development or sustainability to our relationships with remote nonoverlapping descendants, where details on their utility functions are unrecognizable and unpredictable. Second, our successors' social identity dependence on us implies that the values and tastes underlying their utility functions are path dependent. It is pointless to ask whether or not the utility level, total or average, of future individuals would be higher in one possible situation than in another when what lies behind the level will in part depend on our present choice of

public policy and private actions.

Beckerman and Pasek (2001: 82–83) provide a criticism of the developmentalist conception of sustainable development, which has truth in principle, but suffers from technical shortcomings. Here I offer an improved version of their argument. The majority of advocates of this conception presumably affirm the ideal of intergenerational equality on the one hand, and seemingly adhere to the aggregative maximization over generations on the other. Intergenerational egalitarianism maintains that if the differential of some economic index—say, GNP per capita—between the most and least advantageous generations on one path of economic growth is smaller than the differential on another path, then *ceteris paribus* the former path is more desirable than the latter. The aggregative maximizing standpoint holds that if the total net value of some economic index upon all relevant future generations on one path is larger than the value on another, *ceteris paribus* the former path is better than the latter.

In Figures 1 and 2, different generations are sequentially located on a horizontal axis, while the vertical one indicates GNP per capita. Figure 1 illustrates a case where one possible path based on sustainable development (*SD*) initially stays below the other path indicating the maximization of economic development (*MD*), but *MD* soon declines and *SD* rises above *MD*. Then *SD* gradually slows down, but stays above *MD*, probably by virtue of conservation policy and environmentally sensitive technology. One can suppose that under *MD*, GNP per capita of each future generation rises above that of the first generation, possibly thanks to the higher rates of investment and of technological development promoted by earlier generations. In such a case, *SD* represents greater inequality among generations than *MD* does. This means that advocates of the developmentalist interpretation of sustainable development cannot coherently hold intergenerational egalitarianism.¹⁰ What happens if intergenerational inequality is much smaller? Figure 2 illustrates a case where *SD* stays below *MD*, except at the time of the first generation. The figure shows the scenario that *SD*

¹⁰ In noting a conflict between the developmentalist conception of sustainable development and the ideal of intergenerational equality, I do not mean to adhere to the latter. Intergenerational equality is, to say the least, a rather questionable idea, as Beckerman and Pasek (2001: 46–70) argue.

represents lower total wealth than *MD* does over the entire future period. In short, the demands of sustainable development interpreted in a developmentalist way conflict with either intergenerational egalitarianism or the aggregative maximizing view.

The examinations of sustainable development and sustainability so far lead to the conclusion that if one evokes these concepts to justify a public policy to protect the interests of posterity, then one begs the question, because the concepts presuppose that such a policy is justified. It is also observable that resourcist, welfarist, and developmentalist interpretations of sustainable development and sustainability suffer from theoretical and practical problems when the two concepts are employed as general criteria for justice between generations. It needs to be stressed here that I do not intend to deny the possible significance of economic study using these concepts. On the contrary, I believe that it is helpful to define sustainable development or sustainability in an operational way suitable for the specific purpose of economic study and to employ the concept in analysis of intergenerational relationships. My point is that sustainable development and sustainability do not work well as grounds or criteria for concern for future generations.

Intergenerational Fairness

A more promising approach to the question of intertemporal justice than the argument surrounding sustainable development or sustainability might be founded on the idea of intergenerational fairness. In the controversy about an obligation to obey the law in the field of jurisprudence, the theory of fair play has been one of major arguments. The fair play principle was first suggested by H. L. A. Hart (1984[1955]), and then developed by Rawls (1999[1964]).

Rawls supposes that there is a mutually beneficial and just scheme of social cooperation, in which advantage can be obtained only if (nearly) everyone cooperates. Cooperation requires a certain amount of sacrifice from contributors, or at least a certain restriction of their liberty. Nevertheless, every person knows that each can still gain from the scheme without cooperating because (nearly) all of the others will continue to do their part. Under these conditions, the argument goes, the person who has accepted the benefit of the scheme is bound, by a duty of fair play, to do the person's part and not to take advantage of the free benefit by not cooperating.

Obedience to the law is included in such cooperation, since each citizen gains from other citizens' obedience to the law. Rawls's account of an obligation to obey the law has been elaborated by several legal philosophers, while being harshly criticized both by advocates of rival arguments for this obligation and by opponents of the obligation. Although I doubt that the fair play theory makes a success of explaining the obligation of legal obedience, the theory seems to offer a good starting point for justifying intergenerational concern.

Rawls's fair play principle, which concerns a relationship between individuals existing at a single temporal point, can be reformulated in the context of a relationship between groups living at different temporal points. Suppose that there is a long-term scheme of sequential cooperation, in which basic interests can be obtained as long as each generation cooperates, enabling the next generation to lead a safe and healthy life. Cooperation requires a certain amount of sacrifice from contributing generations. However, each generation is able to enjoy the interests without cooperating, thanks to the cooperation of its predecessors. Under these conditions, the generation that has received the basic interests from the scheme is required, by a duty of intergenerational fair play, to bear a prima facie obligation to do its part, regardless of its intention, and not to take advantage of the free interests by not cooperating.

The principle roughly sketched above includes several points requiring explication. Let me begin by explaining what I mean by a prima facie obligation. I say that a person *P* bears a prima facie obligation to do an act *X*, if and only if *P* has the strongest reason *R* to do *X* such that, unless *P* has a moral reason not to do *X* that is at least as strong as *R*, *P*'s failure to do *X* is wrong. Thus, *P* is not finally obligated to do *X* when *P* has a stronger reason than *R* not to do *X*. What is the practical implication of the claim that we have a prima facie obligation to do our part for the sake of posterity? Within intragenerational relationships, we owe one another the obligation of mutual concern, an obvious example of which is the moral prohibition of physical violence and theft. It seems reasonable that some basic obligations of intragenerational concern have priority over all obligations of intergenerational concern. When the former obligations conflict with the latter, the current generation has good reason not to act on behalf of future generations, and thus is not finally obliged to do so. The prima facie formulation is intended to prevent concern for the future at the excessive expense of current basic interests. Of course, the issue of which intragenerational obligation has priority over

intergenerational ones remains controversial, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

What part is each generation obliged to take within the scheme of transgenerational cooperation? To answer this question, I distinguish between two categories of legacy: natural and human-made. Among examples of the natural legacy supporting human safety and health are clean atmosphere, safe drinking water, fertile soil, relatively stable temperature, and several kinds of mineral resources. Each generation has an obligation to bequeath these items of the natural legacy to its successors by refraining from polluting the environment to an unrecoverable degree and from exhausting the resources. Typical examples of the human-made heritage that is crucial to a safe and healthy life include the knowledge of medicine and nutrition and environmentally benign technology for manufacture and transportation. A generation is required to develop these products and to hand them over to its successors.

Each generation receives natural and human-made legacies not only from overlapping preceding generations but also from nonoverlapping ones. Had a mob burned out temples and shrines in the city of Kyoto 200 years ago, for instance, we could not visit the historical buildings and monuments there today. Another important aspect of intergenerational relationships might be that the current generation in a society is beholden to its fellow and foreign predecessors for its heritage. If 300 years ago—in the times of colonialism—one of the great powers had invaded Japan and had burned down Kyoto, we could not enjoy sightseeing. Given that the present generation benefited from all four categories of past generations, this generation is arguably obliged to protect the interests of the corresponding categories of future generations. In addition, several items of natural legacy, including the relatively stable temperature being threatened by global warming, are shared on a global scale. It is impossible to leave these items exclusively for future fellows without including future foreigners.

My principle of intergenerational fairness differs from Rawls's theory of fairness among contemporaries. Two points are particularly relevant. First, I focus on the basic interests on which human safety and health are based, while Rawls talks more broadly about benefit or gain produced through social cooperation. Rawls's principle is vulnerable to a complaint made by Robert Nozick (1974: 90–95), claiming that on Rawls's account, even a person who received a tiny gain in a passive way may be obliged to make a sacrifice by cooperating. My argument is immune to this type of objection. This is because, on my account, only when a generation owes its

predecessors for the basic interests enabling its members to lead a safe and healthy life, that generation has an obligation to bequeath the interests to its successors.

Second, Rawlsian theory tacitly requires the person benefiting from social cooperation to have the intention of contributing to the cooperation and to act on the intention. In contrast, my argument does not demand that the generation profiting from its predecessors' past cooperation conceive an intention to cooperate for the sake of its successors. Each benefiting generation is required to contribute actually to the project of transgenerational cooperation, irrespective of its motives. If one argued that each generation is obligated to intend to cooperate, then one would face the following natural objection: a vast majority of past generations did not intend to cooperate by conserving the natural environment or by saving scarce resources. They simply lacked advanced technology enabling them to exploit the environment and to exhaust the resources. That deforestation, desertification, and diminution of biological plurality on a local scale occurred in some parts of the world exemplifies their lack of intention of environmental conservation and resource saving. Given that our ancestors did not fulfill the obligation to intend transgenerational cooperation, critics might ask why we should discharge such an alleged obligation. My argument on intergenerational fairness does not encounter this kind of criticism, because the argument implies that past generations did fulfill the obligation of cooperation as an unintended by-product of their lack of high technology. In human history, the present generation is the first to have the advanced technology by which its members can consume the natural legacy on a global and gross scale. This generation is consequently the first to be obliged to refrain intentionally from irreparably destroying the environment and to focus on developing environment-friendly technology.

It is noteworthy that, unlike its rivals, the argument based on intergenerational fairness does not meet theoretical difficulties caused by the features of posterity. As to unknowability, we do not need details on the preferences and circumstances of our descendants when we attempt to provide basic interests to them by reducing our negative impacts on them. Passivity does not matter to the fairness theory, which supposes the scheme of sequential cooperation in which each generation is passive in relation to its predecessors. Nor does identity dependence bother this theory, because it is entirely possible to say that we should leave natural and human-made legacies for future individuals, whoever will come into existence in the future.

These arguments thus far are so abstract that the forms of legacy to bequeath need to be identified and the ways of implementing the obligation to hand them over should be determined. What kind of agency should have the primary responsibility for specifying and implementing our obligation to leave heritage for posterity? It is the government. Central and local governments are essentially the organization of comprehensive and formal representation. Representation by the government is comprehensive in that it enacts and implements public policy in the name of all citizens living within the borders of its territory; the representation is formal in the sense that it necessarily acts in its citizens' name, whichever candidates the citizens voted for, or whatever regime holds.¹¹ Ronald Dworkin (1986: 172) eloquently points out the formality of governmental representation.

At the height of the Watergate scandal bumper stickers appeared that read, "Don't blame me; I'm from Massachusetts." They did not say, "Don't blame me; I voted against Nixon," and the difference is important. People asked exoneration from a mistake made by a group to which they belonged—the nation—not in individual innocence but in membership of a different and more immediate community that had acted well, a state that had not voted for a dishonest president.

Because of its representative character, the government bears the primary responsibility for specifying and implementing the obligation of its present citizens to bequeath natural and human-made legacies to future generations.

A similar argument does not apply to any other types of agencies, including nongovernmental associations and nonprofit organizations in civil society, because unlike the government, these agencies are not representative in a comprehensive and formal way. Consider an environmental organization as an example. When the organization raises funds, increases staff, and succeeds in advocacy, its supporters and contributors may well feel proud of it. Their feelings can be explained by referring to the representative function of the organization. However, its representative character cannot be comprehensive, because numerous other environmental organizations also

¹¹ When the regime in question is democratic, the government is not only formally but substantively representative.

exist and represent their own members. Therefore, the environmental organization does not have the same responsibility as the government does in the context of intergenerational morality. If the organization abandoned its mission, the abandonment would disappoint its supporters and maybe more generally the public, but no one could legitimately condemn it.

If it is established by the argument from intergenerational fair play that the present citizens in each country have an obligation to bequeath heritage to future generations, then the adversarial/superseding view is undermined by the fact of governmental representation. This view might be flawed because it claims the large-scale replacement of many environmental roles of the government with those of civil agencies, neglecting both the obligation of the current citizens as a whole to be concerned for the interests of future people and the government's responsibility to enact and implement public policies based on that obligation. There is no reason for organizations and groups in civil society to assume the functions of the government when the government in general achieves its responsibility.

Problems of Government and Prospects of Civil Society

The discussion in the previous section shows, I hope, that at the level of political morality, a government bears the primary responsibility for intergenerational concern. At the level of political reality, however, the government may encounter practical difficulties in carrying out that responsibility. What kind of problems does the government face? Why do they occur? How can agencies in civil society help the government to diminish the problems? In this section, I explore these questions by referring to the literature of public choice, in which government failures are theoretically modeled and empirically observed. In so doing, I examine the adversarial/superseding view from a different angle, focusing on the adversarial/allied dimension of relationships between the government and civil society.

In the field of public choice, the political process is considered on the analogy of market economy. Major political players on the demand and supply sides of the policy market fall into four groups: interest groups, voters, politicians, and bureaucrats. Let us briefly look at models and observations of each group to articulate the problems that

hinder the government in fulfilling its intertemporal responsibility.¹²

Influential players on the demand side of the market of public policy are organized interest groups. According to the theory of collective action addressed by Mancur Olson (1971[1965]), the larger a potential interest group is, the more inactive its members stay in seeking their common interests, unless selective incentives—that is, the advantage of membership or the disadvantage of nonmembership—are provided. Because the number of producers is much smaller than that of consumers, the former group is generally more influential than the latter in political reality. Organized interests get involved in rent seeking, which means the pursuit of monopoly rent through the political process, including negotiating with policy makers and even offering bribes. Since Gordon Tullock's celebrated essay (1967) appeared, numerous studies have been made on the formal logic of and the aggregate social cost caused by rent seeking. The policy areas upon which many rent-seeking cases are reported include public regulations, tariffs, and subsidies.¹³

In contrast to the activeness of organized interests, unorganized voters tend to abstain from voting by making a rational calculation of cost and benefit, as Anthony Downs (1957: 36–50, 260–276) first predicted. A rational self-interested voter calculates the expected utility from the possible victory of each candidate or party, and naturally votes for the candidate or party whose policy proposals promise the highest utility. Obviously, the probability that one's vote decides the outcome of the election is tiny, and thus it is rational for a voter not to vote. The hypothesis of rational abstention appears to lead to the prediction that no rational self-interested individual would ever vote—but millions do. To resolve this paradox, diverse voter models have been proposed and empirically tested. For the purpose of this paper, it is worth noting that

¹² In the following, I refer to only a small number of classical works, because even a brief review of recent developments would require a lengthy list of references. For a comprehensive review of the public choice literature, see Mueller (2003) and Rowley and Schneider (2004).

¹³ By pointing out the facts of rent seeking, I do not suggest the wholesale condemnation of interest groups. Rather, I recognize the partial virtues of organized groups in the situation of pluralism of values and interests. My point is that the rampancy of powerful interest groups might cause a serious policy bias.

many unorganized citizens actually abstain from voting and that their choice is explainable within the rational choice framework. Another noticeable hypothesis on ordinary citizens is that of rational ignorance (Downs, 1957: 207–259). The hypothesis states that because one's vote is a mere drop in the ocean, a rational self-interested individual refrains from collecting the political information necessary to make a wise vote in order to save the cost of information collection. It has been observed in many democracies that myriads of voters lack basic political information.

On the supply side of the policy market, a rational self-interested politician maximizes the probability of being elected. True, it is not plausible to assume that winning an election is the entire purpose of all politicians; for instance, ideological goals are presumably relevant to some of their actions. However, the special importance of winning an election is not deniable, because a politician cannot accomplish any ideological goal in enacting statutes if the politician loses the election. Taking into account collective action, rent seeking, rational abstention, and rational ignorance on the demand side, the effective way to carry an election for a politician is to secure the cooperation of powerful interest groups. Organized interest groups can offer a large amount of votes, political information, and financial contribution in return for preferred policies, whereas general voters cannot. On the other hand, in the standard bureaucrat model originated by William Niskanen (1971), rational self-interested bureaucrats maximize the budget of the department, ministry, or administrative agency to which they belong. This is because budget maximization by bureaucrats may increase their chance of promotion and may enhance their reputation.

The above studies on government failures altogether seem to have negative implications for the government's responsibility for intergenerational concern. First, it might be difficult to launch the environmental regulations of production processes if they would raise the production cost. No businesses would ever support such regulations, and thus politicians would not enact the related laws. Nor would bureaucrats be permitted by the legislature to issue the administrative directives for regulation. Second, when some manufacturers have new technology enabling them to do business under current regulations, they presumably demand the continuance of the regulations so as to retain monopoly rent. Politicians, who need the support of organized interests, have good reason to meet their demands. Bureaucrats also have incentives to apply these regulations rigorously, which may increase their budget.

However, there is no guarantee that the required regulations are desirable for protecting posterity's basic interests.

To lessen the difficulties for a government in carrying out its intertemporal responsibility, civil associations and movements are expected to help the government by getting involved in the policy-making process. Consider the model of political entrepreneurs in the literature on interest groups. In revising the collective action theory, models of political entrepreneurs developed, arguing that the leaders of organizations can be involved in lobbying even in the case of diffusive interests (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young, 1971; Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1978: 66–89; Moe, 1980: 36–72). Of course, political entrepreneurs are not saints. They may use the political process to pursue their own private interests instead of the public interest; besides, they may manipulate the information they provide to potential supporters so that they can effectively attract real support, whatever goal they seek. Nonetheless, the political entrepreneur model does suggest the possibility that some agents and agencies in civil society can create active environmental organizations in the situation of interest-group democracy. Those whom I call environmental entrepreneurs may successfully persuade a substantial portion of the population to become curious about environmental issues, to vote for ecologically sensitive candidates or parties, and to contribute to their organizations.

Once environmental entrepreneurs succeed in making the government launch a policy of intergenerational concern, they can anticipate further success. When a public policy is established, it becomes a new component of the social environment of citizens, inducing them to change their patterns of action. Where a change in citizens' behavioral patterns is extensive and stable, the change influences their values and tastes. Then the public may tend to welcome a further policy proposal in the same direction. This kind of spiral of government policy, citizens' behavior, and their opinion can be found in many policy areas. Where the policy-behavior-opinion spiral exists, the environmental entrepreneurs who succeeded in advocating one policy have reason to expect wider support for their pursuit of further policies.

The relationship between the government and civil associations led by environmental entrepreneurs cannot be adversarial. To have a substantial voice in the game of interest-group politics, these organizations need to engage in the same kinds of activities as organized interests do: raising funds, collecting relevant information,

and negotiating with politicians and bureaucrats. When environmental entrepreneurs believe that the government is making a serious mistake in policy making, they may well resolutely criticize it. However, if they indulge in one-sided protest and unrealistic claims, policy makers may be pushed into the antienvironment camp, and thus the situation may become worse. Contrary to what the adversarial/superseding view insists, environmental associations should develop cooperative, not confrontational, relationships with the legislature and the administration.

Conclusion

In the previous sections, I examined the adversarial/superseding view on the relationship between government and civil society by developing theoretical tools in the literature on intergenerational justice as well as models and observations in the field of public choice. By identifying the features—unknowability, passivity, and identity dependence—of future generations, I pointed out the theoretical difficulties from which major justificatory theories of concern for posterity suffer. Then it was showed that neither sustainable development nor sustainability provides grounds or criteria for intertemporal concern. I provided the alternative argument that we are obliged, by a duty of intergenerational fair play, to bequeath natural and human-made legacies to our successors. This argument, if it is successful, implies that the government acting in our name bears the primary responsibility to specify and implement our obligation of intertemporal concern. The government may face difficulties caused by government failures in carrying out this responsibility, but environmental entrepreneurs and organizations in civil society can help to diminish the difficulties by developing their collaborative relationships with the government.

It follows that the adversarial/superseding view is misguided in two respects. First, at the level of political morality, it claims that the roles of the government should be largely replaced by those of civil associations and movements, neglecting the government's primary responsibility for intergenerational justice. Second, at the level of political reality, this view gives a mistaken prescription for government failures. To grapple with the problems of interest-group democracy, the government-association collaboration is expected to work more effectively than antiestablishment blame and protest. These points suggest that the allied/complementing view is a more promising

approach to the question of intergenerational justice.

Some might complain that my arguments are too compromising at the level of political reality. If we have a genuine obligation to hand over heritage to posterity, why should we not attack the causes of interest-group politics hindering the realization of our obligation through radical reforms of the political process? Possible political reforms, critics might suggest, include strict restrictions on political contributions designed to weaken the demands of organized interests and the centralization and transcendentalization of policy-making processes that will make environmental laws and regulations more effective. My response is twofold. First, as noted before, our obligation of intergenerational concern is a *prima facie* duty, which can be overturned when it conflicts with our basic duties of intragenerational concern. Suggested reforms can be destructive to our political rights, and hence it is doubtful that we should adopt them. Second, democracy respecting the rights and opportunities of participation is an important item of the human-made legacy that we can bequeath to our descendants, even though existing democracies are not perfect. One is thus entitled to be skeptical about the desirability of the reform proposals from the perspective of intertemporal concern. My standpoint may look too idealistic at the political morality level and too realistic at the political reality level. However, it is the combination of the two, realistic idealism, that I believe normative theories should employ.

References

- Barry, Brian, 1999, "Sustainability and Intergenerational Justice," in Andrew Dobson (ed.), *Fairness and Futurity: Essays on Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 93–117.
- Beckerman, Wilfred and Joanna Pasek, 2001, *Justice, Posterity, and the Environment*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Callahan, Daniel, 1971, "What Obligations Do We Have to Future Generations?" *American Ecclesiastical Review* 164(4): 265–280.
- Cohen, Jean L. and Andrew Arato, 1992, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- de-Shalit, Avner, 1995, *Why Posterity Matters: Environmental Policies and Future Generations*, London: Routledge.
- Downs, Anthony, 1957, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, New York: Harper & Row.
- Dworkin, Ronald, 1986, *Law's Empire*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Elliot, Robert, 1989, "The Rights of Future People," *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 6(2): 159–169.
- Feinberg, Joel, 1974, "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations," in William T. Blackstone (ed.), *Philosophy and Environmental Crisis*, Athens: University of Georgia Press, pp. 43–68
- Frohlich, Norman and Joe A. Oppenheimer, 1978, *Modern Political Economy*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Frohlich, Norman, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Oran R. Young, 1971, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Gidron, Benjamin, Ralph M. Kramer, and Lester M. Salamon (eds.), 1992, *Government and the Third Sector: Emerging Relationships in Welfare States*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Golding, Martin P., 1972, "Obligations to Future Generations," *Monist* 56(4): 85–99.
- Habermas, Jürgen, 1990[1962], *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*, Neuauflage, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main.
- Hart, H. L. A., 1984[1955], "Are There Any Natural Rights?" in Jeremy Waldron (ed.), *Theories of Rights*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 77–90.

- Hasegawa, Koichi, 2003, *Kankyo Undo to Atarashi Kokyoken: Kankyo Syakaigaku no Pasupekutibu [Environmental Movements and the New Public Sphere: The Perspective of Environmental Sociology]*, Tokyo: Yuhikaku.
- Moe, Terry M., 1980, *The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mueller, Dennis C., 2003, *Public choice III*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Narveson, Jan, 1978, "Future People and Us," in R. I. Sikora and Brian Barry (eds.), *Obligations to Future Generations*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 38–60.
- Niskanen, William A., 1971, *Bureaucracy and Representative Government*, Chicago: Aldine Publishing.
- Nozick, Robert, 1974, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, New York: Basic Books.
- Olson, Macur, 1971[1965], *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, enlarged ed., Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- O'Neill, John, 1993, *Ecology, Policy and Politics: Human Well-Being and the Natural World*, London: Routledge.
- O'Neill, Onora, 1999, "Distant Strangers and Future Generations," in Tae-Chang Kim and Ross Harrison (eds.), *Self and Future Generations: An Intercultural Conversation*, Cambridge: White Horse Press, pp. 62–69.
- Parfit, Derek, 1984, *Reasons and Persons*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Partridge, Ernest, 1990, "On the Rights of Future Generations," in Donald Scherer (ed.), *Upstream/Downstream: Issues in Environmental Ethics*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 40–66.
- Pezzey, John, 1992, *Sustainable Development Concepts: An Economic Analysis*, World Bank Environment Paper No. 2, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Rawls, John, 1999[1964], "Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play," in John Rawls, *Collected Papers*, ed. by Samuel Freeman, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 117–129.
- , 1999[1971], *A Theory of Justice*, rev. ed., Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Richards, David A. J., 1971, *A Theory of Reasons for Action*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Riedel, Manfred, 1975, "Gesellschaft, bürgerliche," in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, und Reinhart Koselleck (hers.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, Band 2, Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart, SS. 719–800.
- Rowley, Charles K. and Friedrich Schneider (eds.), 2004, *The Encyclopedia of Public Choice*, 2 vols., Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
- Tullock, Gordon, 1967, "The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft," *Western Economic Journal* 5: 224–232.
- Usami, Makoto, 1996, "Syorai Sedai eno Hairyo [Concern for Future Generations]," *Ho Tetsugaku Nenpo 1995 [The Annals of Legal Philosophy 1995]*, pp. 139–150.
- , 1998, "Hairyo no Shatei: Kankyo Rinrigaku to Kokyo Seisaku [The Scope of Concern: Environmental Ethics and Public Policy]," *Kokyo Seisaku: Nihon Kokyo Seisaku Gakkai Nenpo 1998 [Public Policy: The Annals of the Public Policy Studies Association Japan 1998]*, pp. 1–33 (available at <http://www.ppsa.jp/pdf/journal/pdf1998/Usami.pdf>).
- , 2004, "Shorai Sedai, Jiga, Kyodotai [Future Generations, Self, and Community]," *Keizai Kenkyu [Economic Review]* 55(1): 1–14.
- , 2006a, "Shorai Sedai eno Hairyo no Dotokuteki Kiso: Jizoku Kanosei, Kenri, Kosei [The Moral Foundations of Concern for Future Generations: Sustainability, Rights, or Fairness]," in Kotaro Suzumura (ed.), *Sedaikan Koheisei no Ronri to Rinri [The Logic and Ethics of Intergenerational Equity]*, Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, pp. 255–282.
- , 2006b, "Shorai Sedai wo meguru Seisaku to Jiga [Public Policy, Self, and Future Generations]," in Kotaro Suzumura, Makoto Usami, and Tae-Chang Kim (eds.), *Kokyo Tetsugaku 20: Sedaikan Kankei kara Kangaeru Kokyosei [Public Philosophy 20: Publicness from the Perspective of Intergenerational Relations]*, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, pp. 69–87.
- Walzer, Michael, 1992[1991], "The Civil Society Argument," in Chantal Mouffe (ed.), *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, and Community*, London: Routledge, pp. 89–107.
- Wissenburg, Marcel, 1999, "An Extension of the Rawlsian Savings Principle to Liberal Theories of Justice in General," in Andrew Dobson (ed.), *Fairness and Futurity:*

Essays on Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 173–198.

World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 1987, *Our Common Future*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.




Figure 1. Sustainable development vs. intergenerational equality




Figure 2. Sustainable development vs. wealth maximization over generations